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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Arthur L. Jayroe, Jr., in his Capacity as Chief Magistrate 
of Newberry County, Plaintiff,
v. 
Newberry County, South Carolina and Wayne Adams, 
Defendants, 
and 
The Honorable Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr., in his capacity 
as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, 
Intervenor. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000373 
IN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
Opinion No. 27548 

Heard June 16, 2015 – Filed July 22, 2015 

QUESTION ANSWERED "NO"  
Desa A. Ballard and Harvey M. Watson, III, both of Ballard & Watson, of 
West Columbia, for Plaintiff. 
Steve A. Matthews and Sarah P. Spruill, both of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, 
P.A. and James E. Smith, Jr., of James E. Smith, Jr., P.A., all of Columbia, 
for Defendants. 
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Kenneth M. Moffitt, Edward H. Bender and Elizabeth H. Brogdon, Counsel 
to the South Carolina Senate, for Intervenor, President Pro Tempore Hugh K. 
Leatherman, Sr.
PER CURIAM:  We granted plaintiff's request that we exercise our original 
jurisdiction to "determine whether [defendants] have the authority to abolish part-
time magistrate positions in Newberry County."  S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated May 7, 
2015. We hold defendants do not have such authority and therefore answer the 
question "No."  We also note that no Newberry County magistrate position has 
been abolished. 
FACTS
Plaintiff, formerly the part-time Chief Magistrate of Newberry County, brought 
this action in the Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether defendants 
Newberry County and Wayne Adams, County Administrator, have the authority to 
abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County.  In addition, the Court 
permitted the Senate President Pro Tempore to intervene in this action.  Defendants 
and the Intervenor agree with plaintiff that defendants do not have such authority, 
contending that all of defendants' actions have been done in compliance with the 
South Carolina Constitution and applicable statutes. 
Plaintiff was a part-time magistrate in Newberry County.  Under the formula 
established by S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(C) (2007), Newberry County is entitled 
to three magisterial positions. Under this statute, four part-time magistrates equal 
one full-time magisterial position.  Section 22-8-40(E).  During the four year 
period expiring April 30, 2015, Newberry's three magisterial positions were filled 
by two full-time magistrates and three part-time magistrates, one of whom was
plaintiff. See S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-10(A) (Supp. 2014) (last sentence of second 
paragraph). Defendant Newberry County is statutorily mandated to notify the 
senatorial delegation1 representing Newberry County in writing of the number of 
magistrate positions available in the county, as well as other information, as the 
terms near expiration.  S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-10 (A) (third paragraph).   
1 A single senator represents all of Newberry County.
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Defendant Newberry County, acting through defendant Adams pursuant to a vote 
taken at a County Council meeting, wrote its senator invoking § 22-1-10(A) on 
August 21, 2014. In this August letter, the County requested its three magisterial 
positions be filled with three full-time magistrates, thus discontinuing the use of 
part-time magistrates.  On June 2, 2015, the Governor appointed Magistrate Barry 
Koon as a full-time magistrate to fill the magisterial position formerly filled by 
three part-time magistrates, two of whom were petitioner and Koon.  On that same 
date, the Senate confirmed the appointment.  See S.C. Const. art. V, § 26.2  The 
other two magisterial positions in Newberry County were also filled by full-time 
magistrates. 
ISSUE
Do defendants have the authority to abolish a part-time 
magistrate position in Newberry County? 
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that, in effect, § 22-1-10(A) delegates the authority to abolish part-
time magistrate positions to Newberry County.  He contends this statute violates 
this Court's decision in Davis v. County of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 470 S.E.2d 94 
(1996). In Davis, the Court held that counties cannot "abolish" a magistrate's
position, nor may a county, consistent with the unified judicial system, abolish 
magistrate courts entirely within a given county.  Davis, supra. Neither of these 
constitutionally forbidden acts has occurred here. 
Plaintiff contends this language in § 22-1-10(A) is an unconstitutional delegation 
of authority to the county government: 
2 This section provides: 
The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint a number of magistrates for each county 
as provided by law.  The General Assembly shall provide for 
their terms of office and their civil and criminal jurisdiction.  
The terms of office must be uniform throughout the State. 
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At least ninety days before the date of the commencement of 
the terms provided in the preceding paragraph and every four 
years thereafter, each county governing body must inform, in 
writing, the Senators representing that county of the number of 
full-time and part-time magistrate positions available in the 
county, the number of work hours required by each position, 
the compensation for each position, and the area of the county 
to which each position is assigned.  If the county governing 
body fails to inform, in writing, the Senators representing that 
county of the information as required in this section, then the 
compensation, hours, and location of the full-time and part-time 
magistrate positions available in the county remain as 
designated for the previous four years. 
According to plaintiff, this statute delegates to the county control over the number 
of magistrate positions in violation of the constitutional rule set forth in Davis. We
disagree. 
The number of magisterial positions in a given county is determined by the 
formula established in S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(C) and (D) (2007), subject to an 
agreement pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 22-2-40(C) (Supp. 2014) or to 
"termination" pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-30(B) (Supp. 2014).3  Here, there 
is no dispute that the number of magisterial positions in Newberry County is three, 
and that there was no agreement between Newberry County and its senator to 
increase or decrease this number as provided in § 22-2-40(C), nor was any 
magisterial position "terminated" in accordance with § 22-1-30(B).  It is true that in 
their August 2014 letter, defendants asked that the county's three magisterial 
positions be filled by three full-time judges.  That this letter contains merely a 
3 Plaintiff purports to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes, but lacks 
standing since there was no agreement pursuant to § 22-2-40(C) nor was he 
terminated pursuant to § 22-1-30(B).  To the extent he seeks to invoke "public 
interest standing" to challenge the statutes, he ignores both the scope of the 
question we agreed to decide, and the Court's firm policy of declining to decide a 
constitutional challenge unless necessary to a resolution of the case.  E.g. S.C. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 589 S.E.2d 753 (2003). 
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request negates plaintiff's assertion that defendants "control" the number of 
magisterial positions in Newberry County. Further, in arguing that his position 
was abolished, plaintiff misapprehends the statutory scheme: the reallocation of 
Newberry County's three magisterial positions from a combination of full and part-
time judges to three full time magistrates does not constitute a change in the 
number of magisterial positions in the county.  In other words, no position has 
been "abolished." 
We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction to answer the question whether 
defendants have the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in 
Newberry County. We agree with all parties that defendants have no such 
authority, and further agree with defendants and the Intervenor that no part-time or 
full-time Newberry County magisterial position has been abolished.  Rather, as 
permitted by § 22-4-80(E), the part-time magisterial positions, including the one 
previously held by plaintiff, have been combined into one full-time magistrate 
position, and the Newberry County magistrates have been lawfully appointed 
pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, § 26. While we decline plaintiff's invitation to 
expand the scope of this case to address issues of an alleged constitutional conflict 
between S.C. Const. art V, § 26 and art. V, § 4, and his related statutory claims, we 
have reviewed all of plaintiff's arguments and find nothing of merit warranting the 
exercise of our authority to add necessary parties4 and address these additional 
arguments. 
CONCLUSION
Defendants Newberry County and Adams do not have the authority to abolish part-
time magistrate positions in Newberry County.
QUESTION ANSWERED NO. 
PLEICONES, Acting Chief Justice, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., 
and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur. 
4 For example, the Governor would be a necessary party. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Kareem Harry, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000336 
Appeal From Horry County 

Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5332 

Heard May 5, 2015 – Filed July 22, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Meliah Bowers Jefferson, of Wyche Law Firm, of 
Greenville, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert 
Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.   
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and 
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of 
Columbia, and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of 
Conway, for Respondent. 
KONDUROS, J.:  Kareem Harry appeals his murder conviction under the hand of 
one is the hand of all theory of accomplice liability.  He argues the circuit court 
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erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, as the State failed to present any 
direct or substantial circumstantial evidence he acted in concert with Saire Castro, 
his associate and friend, who admitted shooting the victim and pled guilty to 
voluntary manslaughter. We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Harry was dating a woman, Ashley Bledsoe, with whom he had a tumultuous 
relationship. According to Bledsoe, she and Harry dated for about eight or nine 
months, and, for the two weeks prior to the shooting in this case, they lived 
together in the apartment Bledsoe shared with a roommate, Evelyn.  Bledsoe 
testified Harry became abusive to her.  On February 26, 2011, Harry and Bledsoe 
fought, and Bledsoe called the police. When police arrived, Harry fled.  The 
following day, Bledsoe met the victim, Kevin Bowens, through her roommate.  
Bowens took Bledsoe and Evelyn to dinner, and they all went to a club together.  
Bowens spent that night at Bledsoe's apartment.  A friend of Bledsoe and Harry, 
Sage McPhail, owned a truck and helped move Harry's things out of her apartment 
the next day. McPhail took everything except a large plasma television to the 
home where Harry was staying with the mother of his children.  According to 
Bledsoe, she had given the television to Bowens, and Bowens said he would pay 
her for it. 
Harry contacted Bledsoe indicating he wanted his television or the money for it.  
Bledsoe told Harry she had sold it to a female friend.  She texted Bowens asking 
for the money saying the television had belonged to a female friend who was 
demanding the money.  Bowens did not return the television or pay Bledsoe.  
Eventually, Bledsoe told Harry the truth about what happened with the television.  
According to Bledsoe, Harry needed the television or the money the following day 
to pay probation fees that were due. While Bledsoe and Harry were talking on the 
phone, he told her to stop where she was, and he would come get her.  Bledsoe, 
riding with Evelyn at the time, stopped at Waccamaw Hospital, and Harry picked 
her up in McPhail's red truck.1  The two drove to Tommy Byrne's apartment, 
approximately 16.3 miles away, even though Bowens's house was in the Kings 
Grant subdivision only 2.9 miles away from the hospital.  According to Byrne, 
1 According to McPhail, he did minor automotive repair work for friends and he 
had Harry's sport utility vehicle (SUV) to repair its brakes.  McPhail testified he 
left his truck for Harry to drive while he worked on the SUV.   
15 

    
 
 
 
 
                                        
Harry came into the apartment and asked to see Castro.  Castro and Harry had a 
five to eight minute conversation in the living room that Byrne could not overhear 
because he was in the kitchen with his father, who was preparing dinner.  Harry 
then left, and Castro followed, asking Byrne if he wanted to go for a ride.  Byrne 
testified that as they were leaving, Castro went back to the kitchen, where he kept 
his gun on top of a cabinet. Although neither Harry nor Byrne saw Castro retrieve 
the gun, Byrne testified it was well-known Castro had a firearm.2 
Castro and Byrne, driving separately, followed Bledsoe and Harry to Bowens's 
neighborhood. Once there, Harry, Castro, and Byrne got out of their vehicles, and 
Bowens entered the yard area near his garage.  According to Bowens's girlfriend, 
with whom he shared the home, the vehicles sped down the street in front of their 
house and pulled into the middle of the yard.  Harry asked several times about 
getting the television back, but Bowens indicated he was not going to return the 
television. According to Bowens's girlfriend and neighbors, although it was 
unclear exactly what the parties were saying, the conversation was loud.  Harry 
told Bledsoe to get out of the truck, and she stated Bowens had "stolen" the 
television. Harry instructed Bledsoe to get back in the truck, and Castro shot 
Bowens three times. Castro testified he saw Bowens reach for a gun he had in his 
waistband, the outline of which was visible through his shirt, and he shot in self-
defense. Byrne indicated Bowens did not reach for his gun, and Bowens's 
girlfriend and a neighbor testified the gun was still in Bowens's waistband after he 
was shot. 
Harry jumped into the truck with Bledsoe and instructed her to drive away.  After a 
brief chase, Bledsoe stopped the vehicle and surrendered.  Harry fled and police 
later captured him. 
Castro pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and Harry was tried for murder under 
the hand of one is the hand of all theory of accomplice liability.  At trial, Harry 
moved for directed verdict, arguing the State failed to present any direct or 
substantial circumstantial evidence Harry conspired or planned with Castro to 
murder Bowens over the television or to accomplish any illegal purpose.  The 
2 Castro had been arrested for having drugs and guns in a vehicle a few weeks 
earlier. Because his child was also in the vehicle, the Department of Social 
Services required Castro and the child's mother to reside separately from the child, 
and they were staying with Byrne. 
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circuit court denied Harry's motion, and the jury convicted him.  The circuit court
sentenced him to thirty-one years' imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In cases where the State has failed to present evidence of the offense charged, a 
criminal defendant is entitled to a directed verdict."  State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 
416, 429, 753 S.E.2d 402, 408 (2013).  "During trial, [w]hen ruling on a motion for 
a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of 
evidence, not its weight." Id. at 429, 753 S.E. 2d at 408-09 (alteration by court) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "The trial court should grant the directed 
verdict motion when the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is 
guilty, as [s]uspicion implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or 
circumstances which do not amount to proof."  Id. at 429, 753 S.E.2d at 409 
(alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "On the other hand, a trial 
judge is not required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any 
other reasonable hypothesis." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"On appeal, [w]hen reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt must view 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
[S]tate."  Id. (first alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "If the 
[S]tate has presented any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence 
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, this [c]ourt must affirm the 
trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "Circumstantial evidence . . . gains its strength from its combination 
with other evidence, and all the circumstantial evidence presented in a case must 
be considered together to determine whether it is sufficient to submit to the jury."  
State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 567, 748 S.E.2d 265, 272 (Ct. App. 2013).  
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Harry maintains the circuit court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal 
when the State did not present direct or substantial circumstantial evidence proving 
him guilty of murder under the hand of one is the hand of all theory of accomplice 
liability. We disagree. 
"The doctrine of accomplice liability arises from the theory that the hand of one is 
the hand of all." State v. Reid, 408 S.C. 461, 472, 758 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2014) 
17 

  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "Under this theory, one who joins with another 
to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for everything done by his 
confederate incidental to the execution of the common design and purpose."  Id. 
"Where two persons combine to commit an unlawful act and in its execution a 
homicide is committed as a probable or natural consequence thereof, all present 
and participating in the unlawful act are as guilty as the one who committed the 
fatal act." State v. Fields, 314 SC. 144, 146 n.1, 442 S.E.2d 181, 182 n.1 (1994).  
Except in rare situations, a person committing an unlawful act 
is legally responsible for all natural or necessary consequences 
thereof. One combining and confederating with others to 
accomplish an illegal purpose is criminally liable for everything 
done by either him or his confederates which follows 
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of the 
probable and natural consequences, though not intended as a 
part of the original design or common plan. 
State v. McCall, 304 S.C. 465, 469-70, 405 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 1991), 
overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 
(1999).
The common purpose may not have been to kill and murder, 
but if it was unlawful, as, for instance, to break in, and steal, 
and in the execution of this common purpose a homicide is 
committed by one, as a probable or natural consequence of the 
acts done in pursuance of the common design, then all present 
participating in the unlawful common design are as guilty as the 
slayer. 
State v. Cannon, 49 S.C. 550, 555, 27 S.E. 526, 530 (1897). 
The hand of one is the hand of all theory of guilt is more often termed the natural 
consequences doctrine in other jurisdictions. See State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d 886, 
896 n.11 (R.I. 2012) (referencing the acceptance of this theory of aiding and 
abetting by the Second Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, District of
Columbia, and South Carolina).  "In order to establish the parties agreed to achieve 
an illegal purpose, thereby establishing presence by pre-arrangement, the State 
need not prove a formal expressed agreement, but rather can prove the same by 
18 

  
 
 
 
 
circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the parties."  State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 
347, 354, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010).   
While not controlling, we find the facts in People v. Miller, 2008 WL 1899560 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008), to be analogous to the facts of this case and its disposition, 
therefore, informative.  In that case, Miller asked another man, Baillie, to 
accompany him to confront a third man (Victim) regarding Victim's refusal to 
provide Miller's sister with a bid for installing an air conditioner.  Id. at *1.  The 
prosecution argued Miller anticipated getting into a fight with Victim and wanted 
Baillie to go with him to back him up.  Id.  Miller knew Baillie normally carried a 
gun; Baillie was willing to use his gun; Baillie held resentment toward Victim; and 
Baillie would fight, if Miller needed help.  Id.  Miller was convicted of murder, and 
the appellate court affirmed that conviction founded upon the natural consequences 
doctrine. Id. at *3. 
This court has similarly held circumstantial evidence establishing a defendant 
called for "backup" from someone with a gun in anticipation of an altercation 
could withstand a directed verdict motion.  In Gibson, a disagreement between 
parties at a bar ended in one man's shooting death.  390 S.C. at 351-53, 701 S.E.2d 
at 768-69. In determining under the hand of one hand of all theory, the defendant, 
Adams Gibson, was not entitled to a directed verdict, this court found Adams 
called his brother, Jacques, to the bar and, instead of leaving with him, called 
Jacques inside the bar to point out the men with whom he had been arguing.  Id. at 
355, 701 S.E.2d at 770. Furthermore, [a witness] testified Adams went to 
Jacques's car and retrieved a gun moments before the shooting and although they 
left separately, both men fled the scene. Id. The court concluded this evidence 
was sufficient to withstand Adams's directed verdict motion.  
Here, at minimum, the evidence creates the inferences 
that Adams informed Jacques of the situation, that the 
reason for the call may not have been solely for the 
purpose of removing Adams from the scene, and that 
Adams was aware a firearm was available for him to
retrieve from Jacques's white sedan.  When viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, the circumstantial 
evidence in this case infers Adams and Jacques may have 
acted in concert in assaulting the men from Winnsboro.   
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Id. 
In the present case, the circuit court did not err in sending Harry's case to the jury.  
The State presented substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 
infer Harry planned with Castro to confront Bowens regarding the television and 
his recent encounter with Bledsoe and assault him or otherwise take the television 
by force. The record demonstrates Bledsoe and Harry went out of their way to 
pick up Castro, and after a lengthy private discussion, Castro, an individual known 
to carry a gun, followed Bledsoe and Harry to Bowens's home.  The group did not 
arrive at his residence by happenstance but by coordinated effort led by Harry.  
Once they conspired to confront a known drug dealer,3 who approached them with 
a gun in his waistband, the natural consequences that flowed from that planned 
altercation are the responsibilities of both men.  Additionally, Harry, Bledsoe, 
Castro, and Byrne all fled the scene together, with Harry and Bledsoe absconding 
in a borrowed vehicle. Viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the 
State, we find the circuit court did not err in denying Harry's motion for directed 
verdict. Whether the evidence presented rose to the quantum of proof required for 
conviction was a question for the jury.  Therefore, the ruling of the circuit court is 
AFFIRMED. 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
3 Bowens's girlfriend testified Bowens sold drugs.  McPhail testified he purchased 
marijuana and cocaine from Harry on different occasions.  Harry testified he spoke 
to Bowens on the phone prior to going to his house and determined they "had 
people in common" and the area where they live is a small place where people 
know each other.   
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KONDUROS, J.:  Yancey Roof (Wife) appeals the family court's alimony award, 
contending it erred in reducing her previously modified award and in requiring her 
to pay back, via offset of her attorney's fees award, the overpayment of alimony 
she received during the pendency of this case on remand.  We affirm as modified. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Wife and Kenneth Steele (Husband) married in 1993.  Wife was diagnosed with 
multiple sclerosis (MS) in 2000, and the parties separated in 2004 resulting in a 
2006 divorce. During the marriage, Wife worked as an employee at a frame shop 
that she and Husband eventually purchased with a partner.  Husband worked for 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield and at the time of the divorce, earned approximately 
$60,000 per year. Wife worked in the frame shop and was earning $16,800 
annually. The parties agreed Husband would pay Wife $300 per month in alimony 
and maintain health insurance on her through his employer at a cost of $87 per 
month.  Wife also received child support for the parties' two children.  After two 
years, Husband's employer stopped permitting ex-spouses to be covered on its 
health insurance plan. Wife petitioned the family court for a modification in her 
alimony based on the change in circumstances, primarily her lack of insurance 
coverage, and the expense for getting coverage while suffering from MS.  Other 
changes in circumstances included a decrease in Wife's earnings, an increase in 
Husband's earnings, and the discontinuation of $200 per month in child support 
based on the children's majority.   
The family court increased Wife's alimony to $1,547.65.  The family court tied the 
award to the cost of Wife's insurance coverage.  Husband appealed, and this court 
reversed and remanded, indicating although the change in circumstances warranted
an increase in Wife's alimony, the agreement between the parties did not mandate 
that alimony be tied directly to the cost of health insurance.  See Roof v. Steele, 396 
S.C. 373, 389, 720 S.E.2d 910, 919 (2011).
On remand, Wife testified her most recent annual earnings at the frame shop were 
$12,000 and the partner with whom she operated the frame shop had retired.  The 
frame shop operated approximately thirty-eight hours per week, and Wife stated 
she had to stay longer sometimes to complete her work.  She indicated her health is 
"OK" and she does not like to think of herself as disabled.  However, she also 
described her current physical and emotional condition as "a wreck" and admitted 
working is "challenging." She further testified she suffers from "optic neuritis a lot 
in [her] eyes, extreme fatigue, and massive headaches."  She provided she had lost 
a lot of sensation on the right side of her body and indicated it "doesn't function 
very well." This lessening in function affected her ability to do some of the fine 
manual framing work as quickly.  Additionally, her condition made her depressed.  
She testified she did not believe she could keep a job other than running the frame
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shop because she needs to be able to work at her own pace and thus, she has not 
sought other employment.  Wife stated she has gone to the Social Security website 
using her smartphone and completed a preliminary screening, which indicated she 
was not eligible. Wife testified she had not pursued disability or Medicaid further 
because she believed she should work and was unaware one could earn a certain 
amount of income and still qualify for benefits.   
With regard to her insurance, Wife maintained her coverage through the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) after Husband's 
employee insurance coverage ended, and she was able to obtain a private policy in 
the amount of $1,247.65 per month.  Husband paid this premium pursuant to court 
directive. The cost of the policy increased by approximately $200 per month 
thereafter, and Wife dropped the insurance because she could not pay the premium.  
However, Wife still accepted the alimony payments from Husband and used them
to pay other bills. 
Wife indicated she was not living at the same standard as during the marriage 
when she took vacations with the family, spent time on the lake, purchased new 
clothing, and had health insurance. Additionally, Wife testified she had listed 
$3,600 as the annual alimony she received on two prior tax returns but 
acknowledged the money for her insurance premium should have been considered 
alimony as well.  She further indicated those returns were prepared by her brother-
in-law and Husband deducted the full amount paid on his tax returns.   
Husband testified he suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure and had a heart 
attack requiring a stint in 2007. He is a network administrator with Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield and testified his earnings had increased from $5,000 per month during 
the marriage to approximately $6,755 per month plus an annual $7,600 incentive 
bonus. Husband also testified he had inherited approximately $300,000 to 
$350,000 since the divorce and had purchased some personal items, including a 
boat and a motorcycle, and had taken a few cruises and a trip to Mexico.  He 
indicated he invested the remainder and purchased four rental properties that had 
yet to earn a profit. Additionally, he stated he pays for one child's college expenses 
and has paid the majority of the children's healthcare expenses.   
Doris Ann Hozey, a self-employed insurance agent, testified the current cost to 
insure Wife would be $1,612.27 monthly.  However, she anticipated once the 
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Affordable Health Insurance Act enrollment began, Wife could be covered for 
approximately $640 to $720 per month. 
The family court determined "[e[ven though her expenditures exceed her income, 
[Wife] has done nothing to improve her financial circumstances.  Although she 
earns much less than minimum wage, she was [sic] not considered closing her 
business and/or seeking other employment."  With regard to not maintaining her 
health insurance most recently, the court stated "[i]t appears that [Wife] is 
complacent in her predicament, and instead of taking responsibility to improve her 
own income to at least cover necessities, so that she could use the alimony to cover 
insurance, she has sought increased alimony from [Husband]."  "[Wife] did 
nothing to mitigate her future healthcare costs.  She did not explore other 
employment, employment that would increase her earnings and/or provide health 
care coverage. She did not seek to improve her education; she did not apply for 
Medicaid or Social Security Disability." 
Ultimately, the family court found "[Wife]'s disability does not affect her ability to 
work; she is capable of working full-time," and "capable of earning at least 
minimum wage."  The family court therefore imputed a gross annual income to 
Wife of $15,072.00. The family court modified Husband's alimony payment to 
$796.51 per month and required Wife to repay the overpayment of alimony, 
$15,022.80, received since the date of remand.   
With regard to attorney's fees, the family court found Wife had been successful in 
increasing her alimony payment overall from $300 per month and Husband was 
better able to pay attorney's fees although "[h]ad [Wife] put forth as much effort to 
improve her financial situation and become self-sufficient as she did to increase 
her alimony payment, she may not have had as much debt as she does today, as she 
would not owe as much in attorney's fees."  Nevertheless, the family court awarded 
Wife $25,000 of her $29,753.31 attorney's fees.  The family court ordered the 
award offset the repayment of Husband's alimony overpayment so Husband would 
actually pay $10,118.58 to Wife's attorney.1 
1 At the conclusion of a previous hearing, the family court had awarded Wife 
$10,000 in attorney's fees, which Husband deposited with the court until the 
ultimate conclusion of this matter.   
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STANDARD OF REVIEW2 
The family court is a court of equity and on appeals therefrom the appellate court 
reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Holmes v. Holmes, 399 S.C. 499, 504, 
732 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 2012).  However, this broad standard of review does 
not require the appellate court to disregard the factual findings of the family court, 
and the appellant is not relieved of the burden of demonstrating error in the family 
court's findings of fact.  Id. "Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the family 
court in an equity case unless its decision is controlled by some error of law or the 
appellant satisfies the burden of showing the preponderance of the evidence 
actually supports contrary factual findings by this court."  Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Alimony Award 
Wife alleges the family court erred in failing to award her a higher amount of 
alimony.  We agree. 
Section 20-3-170(A) (2014) of the South Carolina Code provides: 
Whenever any husband or wife, pursuant to a judgment 
of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, has been 
required to make his or her spouse any periodic payments 
of alimony and the circumstances of the parties or the 
financial ability of the spouse making the periodic 
2 Wife characterizes the standard of review as an abuse of discretion standard.  
However, since Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 709 S.E.2d 650 (2011), this court 
has employed a de novo standard of review in alimony award and modification 
cases.  See Holmes v. Holmes, 399 S.C. 499, 504, 732 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 
2012) (citing de novo standard of review in considering the husband's appeal in 
change of circumstances alimony case); Way v. Way, 398 S.C. 1, 7, 726 S.E.2d 
215, 219 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing de novo standard of review in the husband's 
appeal from permanent, periodic alimony award and equitable distribution to the 
wife); McKinney v. Pedery, 406 S.C. 1, 6, 749 S.E.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing de novo standard of review in the husband's appeal from the termination of 
the wife's alimony obligation), cert. granted (Aug. 6, 2014).
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payments shall have changed since the rendition of such 
judgment, either party may apply to the court which 
rendered the judgment for an order and judgment 
decreasing or increasing the amount of such alimony 
payments or terminating such payments and the court, 
after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard and to 
introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make such 
order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, 
with due regard to the changed circumstances and the 
financial ability of the supporting spouse, decreasing or 
increasing or confirming the amount of alimony provided 
for in such original judgment or terminating such 
payments. 
"Many of the same considerations relevant to the initial setting of an alimony 
award may be applied in the modification context as well, including the parties'
standard of living during the marriage, each party's earning capacity, and the 
supporting spouse's ability to continue to support the other spouse."  Holmes, 399 
S.C. at 505, 732 S.E.2d at 216-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Per statute, 
the complete list of factors the family court can consider in setting alimony 
includes (1) duration of the marriage; (2) physical and emotional health of the 
parties; (3) educational background of the parties; (4) employment history and 
earning potential of the parties; (5) standard of living established during the 
marriage; (6) current and reasonably anticipated earnings of the parties; (7) current 
and reasonably anticipated expenses and needs of the parties; (8) marital and 
nonmarital properties of the parties; (9) custody of children; (10) marital 
misconduct or fault; (11) tax consequences; (12) prior support obligations; and (13) 
other factors the court considers relevant.  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (2014).  
"Whether termed voluntary underemployment, imputation of income, or the failure 
to reach earning potential, the case law is clear that when a payor spouse seeks to 
reduce support obligations based on his diminished income, a court should 
consider the payor spouse's earning capacity."  Hawkins v. Hawkins, 403 S.C. 228, 
242, 742 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Likewise, it is proper to consider a supported spouse's earning capacity and 
impute income to a spouse who is underemployed or unemployed."  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  "However, courts are reluctant to invade a party's 
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freedom to pursue the employment path of their own choosing or impose 
unreasonable demands upon parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish Wife is capable 
of working a full-time job for another employer for forty hours per week.  While 
Wife asserts her health is "OK" and she is able to work in the frame shop, the 
greater weight of the evidence suggests she would not be able to work a full-time 
job elsewhere. Wife's desire to participate in the workforce in a way that was 
manageable with her MS simply does not compel that conclusion.  The record 
shows Wife suffers myriad symptoms from MS and her work history consists of 
training horses and working in this frame shop.  She has a high school diploma and 
no computer skills.  No evidence was presented regarding prevailing job 
opportunities or earning levels in the community for an employee with Wife's skill 
set or for an employee with MS or other chronic illness.  Requiring Wife to attempt 
working full-time in another, less flexible environment is an unreasonable demand 
based on Wife's long list of undisputed ailments and work history.
Other allegations of error include the finding Wife did not attempt to mitigate her 
healthcare expenses by pursuing Medicaid or Social Security benefits.  The record 
shows Wife did some tentative inquiry into those programs that left her believing 
she would not qualify, particularly if she continued earning income on her own.  
The family court's order is unclear regarding how its finding on this issue affected 
the alimony award, but the record does not support the characterization of Wife's
failure as willful complacency.
In examining the list of relevant factors, all militate toward a higher alimony award 
to Wife. The marriage was of a relatively lengthy duration during which the 
parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle Wife no longer enjoys.  Husband has more 
education, a more lucrative employment history, and higher anticipated earnings, 
and although his health is not perfect, no testimony was presented it interferes with 
his ability to work. Additionally, Wife's expenses are not unreasonable or out of 
line with the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the marriage, and her physical and 
emotional health is not as good as Husband's.  The parties have no other support 
obligations and have never alleged misconduct in the breakup of their marriage.    
Based on our review of the record presented and consideration of the requisite 
factors, we find a monthly alimony award of $1,550 to be appropriate.  This award 
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is taxable to Wife and deductible to Husband and is retroactive to the date of Judge 
Hurley's final order. 
II. Overpayment of Alimony 
Wife appeals the portion of the family court's order requiring her to repay the 
excess alimony paid by Husband via offset of her attorney's fee award.  Based on 
our increase in Wife's alimony award, we need not address this point as our ruling 
results in there having been no overpayment to Wife.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(noting an appellate court need not address an appellant's remaining issues when its 
determination of a prior issue is dispositive).  We take this opportunity to clarify 
that Husband is to pay Wife's attorney fees in the amount of $25,000 as awarded 
by the family court. The $10,000 held by the clerk of court shall be disbursed 
immediately, and Husband shall make monthly payments to Wife's attorney in the 
amount of $500 per month on the fifteenth day of each month until the remaining 
balance of $15,000 is paid in full.   
Based on all of the foregoing, the order of the family court is  
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.:  In this boundary dispute action, Betty L.S. Judy appeals the 
trial court's setting of the boundary line, contending it was arbitrary and the only 
reasonable inference was the boundary should be set where prior plats and surveys 
showed it. We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wilbur L. Judy, Sr. and John A. Howell, Jr. owned adjoining tracts of land in 
Dorchester County (the Judy Property and the Howell Property, respectively).  In 
the early 1970s, Interstate 95 was constructed next to their properties.  They both 
allowed the Department of Transportation to remove dirt from their respective 
properties, in turn creating a pond on each property.  Between the ponds was a strip 
of land known as the dike or dike road.  Both owners used the dike. 
John died, leaving the Howell Property to his wife, Marion S. Howell.  Marion 
placed a gate across the road through the Howell Property leading to the Judy 
Property because she was concerned drugs were being used at the ponds.  
According to Kay Howell Jordan, John and Marion's daughter, Marion gave 
Wilbur a key to the gate but the problems continued.  Marion changed the lock and 
gave Wilbur a new key. Because the problems still continued, she changed the 
lock again and according to Kay tried to give Wilbur a new key, which he refused.  
Wilbur and Betty's son, Wilbur Judy, Jr. (Roy), testified his family was eventually 
denied access through the Howell Property.   
Wilbur died in 1993, leaving his property to his wife, Betty.  According to Roy, he 
began investigating where the boundary line was located between the two 
properties after Marion blocked driving access to the Judy Property through the 
Howell Property. Roy had a survey prepared, which showed a billboard John had 
constructed was actually on the Judy Property.  Betty filed a lawsuit against 
Marion and another neighbor, Ronnie Elrod,1 for trespass and an easement.  See
Judy v. Howell, Op. No 2004-UP-199 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 24, 2004) (Judy II); 
Judy v. Howell, Op. No. 2001-UP-423 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 8, 2001) (Judy I). 
The master found and this court affirmed the easement action was barred by res 
judicata due to an earlier action Wilbur brought that was dismissed after his death.  
Judy I at 4.  However, this court reversed the master's decision that the trespass 
action was barred by res jusdicata and remanded that action for trial.  Judy I at 5. 
Following trial, this court affirmed the master's finding the billboard was on the 
Judy Property. Judy II at 3. The court noted the parties had not asked the master 
1 To access the Judy Property, the Judy family first had to cross Elrod's property 
before they could cross the Howell Property. 
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to determine the boundary of the properties and thus it was not preserved for this
court's review on appeal.  Judy II at 3. 
Marion later died, leaving the Howell Property to her children, Kay, Marion 
Howell Tolson (Marion T.), and Lewis Virgil Howell (collectively, the Howells).  
At some point after losing access through the Howell Property, the Judy family 
began accessing their property by coming down a narrow path beside the railroad 
tracks, with the railroad's permission.2  After Roy received the survey around 1995, 
he installed a fence along what he believed was the property line, which caused the 
Howells to lose vehicle access to the dike.   
The Judy and Howell families met several times and reached a settlement in 2009 
that allowed the Judy family to travel over the Howell Property to get to the Judy 
Property and to share the dike.  The trial court found the settlement agreement 
unenforceable. 
On August 12, 2010, the Howells filed a complaint against Betty, requesting a 
declaratory judgment that the boundary line of the properties is in the center of the 
dike or in the alternative, as shown in an attached plat.  They also requested the 
court issue an order of quiet title declaring the property line as requested.  Further, 
they contended if the court did not set the property line as they requested, they 
were entitled to an easement on the dike.  Additionally, they asserted Betty should 
be estopped from denying them access to the dike.  Betty filed an answer denying 
most of the complaint and requesting the court dismiss the complaint.  
At trial, Roy was present on Betty's behalf with her power of attorney.  Lewis 
Edward Jordan, Kay's husband, testified John and Wilbur had agreed the dike was 
the boundary line for the properties and had used it without any problems.  Roy 
testified that "to the best of [his] knowledge," Wilbur and John had not "fussed 
about" the dike. The Howells and Kay's husband testified the Howell family and 
the Judy family both maintained the dike, but Roy testified only he did.  
Betty sought to qualify Ben Coker, Jr. as an expert in land surveying, but the 
Howells objected.  The trial court did not qualify him in surveying because he was 
not licensed as a land surveyor and was not formally educated in land surveying.
2 At trial, a letter and document were introduced showing an easement from the 
railroad to Wilbur but it was not executed or recorded.  
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The court did qualify him as an expert in the area of field work.  He testified about 
the field work he did in 1995 for a plat (Ashley Plat) for the Judy family signed by 
Paul Clifton Lawson, Jr. He used a 1927 plat (F.A. Moorer Plat) as a basis for his 
plat, and his plat agreed with that plat.  He testified the measurements on the F.A. 
Moorer Plat were "very crude measurements compared to our measurements now."
Coker testified he also tried to locate points on a plat from 1867 (1867 Plat) but 
could not locate any of the points shown on it. He indicated the deeds for the two 
properties were ambiguous and did not show metes and bounds. He admitted on 
cross-examination one of the measurements he found in doing his field work did 
not match the F.A. Moorer Plat. He also stated his field work did not match with 
the 1867 Plat. The Ashley Plat showed the dike as being located completely on the 
Judy Property.
John David Bass testified as an expert in surveying on behalf of the Howells.  He 
prepared a plat in 1998 (Bass Plat) for the Howells. He testified he used several 
old plats and surveys for the basis of his plat. He indicated he used the 1867 Plat, 
but it did not close perfectly because old compasses only measured to the nearest 
degree. He testified he took the error and "pushed" it into Interstate 95. He 
testified his plat agreed with the 1867 Plat while the Ashley Plat agreed with the 
F.A. Moorer Plat. On cross-examination, he testified he could have pushed the 
error anywhere. On redirect, Bass testified that by pushing the error into Interstate 
95, it actually benefited the Judy Property. He testified he based his plat off of one 
iron. He testified the Ashley Plat relied on a sweetgum tree shown on the F.A. 
Moorer Plat but because the sweetgum tree was no longer there when the Ashley 
Plat was created, it relied on angles and bearings without knowing if it was correct.  
Because of that, the boundary line could have been moved either way. The Bass 
Plat shows the dike as approximately half on the Howell Property and half on the 
Judy Property, divided diagonally down the middle.
Coker testified that when Bass made his plat, because he could not find the corners 
shown on the plat he was using, he drove or set his own corners except for the one 
he found. Lawson testified he agreed with Bass the 1867 Plat did not close but 
thought Bass should not have placed all of the error in one spot because it was
accumulated error.
Following the trial, the trial court found "the property line [was] located in the 
middle of the dike road." It noted the two professional surveyors who testified 
disagreed as to where the property line was located based on their field work and 
32 

  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
prior surveys.  It found "the parties['] past actions and usage of the property are 
compelling evidence in [its] determination." It granted the parties "an easement 
right in and to the dike road for the purposes of ingress and egress over and across 
the earthen dike." Betty filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting the trial 
court reconsider the testimony regarding the usage of the dike, the fencing placed 
upon the dike, and the documentation and exhibits regarding those issues.  She also 
requested the trial court reconsider the testimony, documentation, and evidence 
presented regarding the plats, witnesses, and surveyors.  She contended the trial 
court erred in failing to rule the Ashley Plat correctly showed the boundary line.  
The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A boundary dispute is an action at law and the location of a disputed boundary 
line is a question of fact." Bodiford v. Spanish Oak Farms, Inc., 317 S.C. 539, 
544, 455 S.E.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).  On appeal of an 
action at law tried without a jury, we will not disturb the trial court's findings of 
fact unless no evidence reasonably supports the findings.  Townes Assocs. v. City 
of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976).  Additionally, the 
appellate court can correct errors of law. Okatie River, L.L.C. v. Se. Site Prep, 
L.L.C., 353 S.C. 327, 334, 577 S.E.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Linda Mc
Co. v. Shore, 390 S.C. 543, 555, 703 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2010) ("In an action at law, 
the appellate court will correct any error of law, but it must affirm the special 
referee's factual findings unless there is no evidence that reasonably supports those 
findings." (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The trial court's factual findings in 
a law action are equivalent to a jury's findings.  Chapman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 
S.C. 565, 567, 211 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1975).  Questions regarding credibility and the 
weight of the evidence are exclusively for the trial court.  Sheek v. Crimestoppers 
Alarm Sys., 297 S.C. 375, 377, 377 S.E.2d 132, 133 (Ct. App. 1989).  "We may not 
consider the case based on our view of the preponderance of the evidence, but must 
construe the evidence presented to the [trial court] so as to support [its] decision 
wherever reasonably possible."  Id.  "We must look at the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the respondents and eliminate from consideration all evidence to 
the contrary." Id.
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
Betty argues the boundary line drawn by the trial court is arbitrary.  She asserts the 
record contains no evidence either party acted as though the boundary between the 
properties was along the dike.  We disagree. 
"A disputed boundary line can be established by acquiescence of the parties."  
Kirkland v. Gross, 286 S.C. 193, 197, 332 S.E.2d 546, 548-49 (Ct. App. 1985), 
receded from on other grounds by Boyd v. Hyatt, 294 S.C. 360, 364 S.E.2d 
478 (Ct. App. 1988). "[A]cquiescence is a question of fact determined by the 
intent of the parties." Id. at 198, 332 S.E.2d at 549. 
[I]f a party stands by, and sees another dealing with 
property in a manner inconsistent with his rights, and 
makes no objection, he cannot afterwards have relief.  
His silence permits or encourages others to part with their 
money or property, and he cannot complain that his 
interest[s] are affected.  His silence is acquiescence and it 
estops him. 
McClintic v. Davis, 228 S.C. 378, 383, 90 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1955) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
"If adjoining landowners occupy their respective premises up to a certain line, 
which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a long period of time, they are 
precluded from claiming the boundary line thus recognized and acquiesced in is 
not the true one." Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 26, 358 S.E.2d 390, 
392 (1987). "In other words, such recognition of, and acquiescence in, a line as the 
true boundary line, if continued for a sufficient length of time, will afford a 
conclusive presumption that the line thus acquiesced in is the true boundary line."  
Knox v. Bogan, 322 S.C. 64, 72, 472 S.E.2d 43, 48 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The length of time required is usually that prescribed by 
the statute of limitations.  Id.  However, acquiescence can be established even if 
the period of time is very short; acquiescence need not continue for the period 
necessary to establish adverse possession.  McClintic, 228 S.C. at 384, 90 S.E.2d at 
366. For a new boundary to be established by acquiescence, both parties must 
recognize a particular line constituted the true property line.  Croft v. Sanders, 283 
S.C. 507, 510, 323 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 1984).   
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In Coker v. Cummings, 381 S.C. 45, 55, 671 S.E.2d 383, 388 (Ct. App. 2008), 
the appellant "offered plats and an affidavit in support of his contention the 
boundaries on the ground are incorrect." However, this court found "the record 
contains nothing to dispute Respondents' evidence they have lived on their 
property with the boundaries as they claim for at least twenty years.  The plats 
simply show that at some point, the boundaries may have been as [the appellant]
asserts they were intended." Id. 
Witnesses from both sides testified Wilbur and John operated as though the dike 
was the boundary between their two properties since the Department of 
Transportation created it. Kay's husband testified Wilbur and John decided where 
the boundary would be and operated as if it was the boundary.  The location of a 
boundary in a boundary dispute is a question of fact.  Also, whether the parties 
acquiesced is a question of fact. In an action at law, we are to affirm the trial 
court's findings of fact if any evidence supports those findings.  Here, the record 
contains evidence to support the finding that Wilbur and John recognized or 
acquiesced that the dike was the boundary.3  Accordingly, the trial court did not err 
in finding the parties' actions dictated the line be set along the dike.4  Therefore, the 
trial court's order is 
3 We note this court has previously held "a compiled line, created merely for the 
convenience of presently avoiding a dispute, is unacceptable as a basis for an order 
establishing a true boundary line." Clements v. Young, 310 S.C. 73, 75, 425 S.E.2d 
63, 64-65 (Ct. App. 1992). In that case, a surveyor testified he created a tie line as 
a matter of convenience to complete a partition.  Id. at 75, 425 S.E.2d at 64. 
The special referee determined the tie line was the boundary of the property, but 
this court reversed finding the record contained no evidence the tie line was the 
boundary between the two properties. Id. at 74-76, 425 S.E.2d at 64-65. The court 
found "the tie line is an artificially compiled line which does not evidence the true 
boundary between the properties." Id. at 75, 425 S.E.2d at 64. In Clements, no 
testimony or other evidence was presented the owners of the properties believed 
the tie line was the border of their properties.  Here, all the parties testified they 
had always acted as though the dike was the boundary between their two 
properties.  Therefore, we do not find Clements applicable here. 
4 Betty also contends the only reasonable inference from the evidence is the 
boundary line is located in the place identified in the F.A. Moorer Plat, the 1970 
Highway Department maps, and the Ashley Plat.  Based on our decision that the 
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AFFIRMED. 

THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 

trial court properly found the parties had acquiesced in the boundary line, we need 
not address this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not 
review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the 
appeal). 
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